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Abstract
Background: Outbreaks of low and high pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI, HPAI) H5N2 in chickens have occurred
in Taiwan since 2003 and 2012, respectively. Fully understanding the different awareness, attitudes and protective
behaviors adopted by workers in live-poultry markets (LPMWs) and local community residents (CRs) to face the
challenges of LPAI and HPAI is very important to minimize viral adaptations to human populations.
Methods: A structural questionnaire containing information on respondents’ occupation, personal risk awareness,
attitudes toward different policies, and preventative measures was administered. The two-stage survey (before
and after HPAI H5N2 outbreaks) was conducted from 2007 to 2012, including: (1) 430 LPMWs and 418 CRs at LPMs from
different geographical areas of Taiwan after the government announced outbreaks of LPAI H5N2 during 2007–2009, and
(2) 73 LPMWs and 152 CRs at two LPMs in central Taiwan after the HPAI H5N2 outbreaks in 2012. The chi-squared test
and logistic regression were applied for univariate and multivariate analyses, respectively.
Results: Before HPAI-H5N2 outbreaks, higher educated respondents demonstrated greater risk awareness and concerns
regarding AI. However, LPM-workers protected themselves less from AI viruses (AIVs) and had lower acceptance of human
or avian influenza vaccines. Most importantly, the participants who opposed (versus agreed with) the policy on banning
live-poultry slaughtering at LPMs reported lower awareness of government prevention and control policies [Odds
Ratio (OR): 0.76, 95 % Confidence Interval (CI): 0.56–1.01] or practiced preventive measures (OR: 0.42, 95 % CI: 0.25–0.70).
After HPAI-H5N2 outbreaks, the risk awareness about AI in central Taiwan significantly increased [LPAI to HPAI LPMWs:
34.6 to 65.6 %, p < 0.05; CRs: 44.0 to 76.5 %, p < 0.05] and LPMWs’ belief in the effectiveness of vaccination to
prevent human or avian influenza virus infection strikingly decreased (92.3 to 68.5 %, p < 0.05).
Conclusions: Risk awareness depends on high or low pathogenicity of AIVs, working in LPMs, levels of education, age,
and proximity to the sites of severe AI outbreaks. Regardless of novel LPAI or HPAI virus reassortants that pose
public health risks, prompt and clear risk communication focusing on both correct information about AIVs and
the most appropriate preventive measures are important for effective prevention of human infection.
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Background
Since the first occurrence of HPAI H5N1 human cases
in Hong Kong in 1997, the public health threat of high
pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) has been a major global
issue [1]. Exposure to live poultry was significantly associ-
ated with symptomatic or fatal cases of H5N1 [2]. As a
result, Hong Kong government officials rapidly closed
live-poultry markets (LPMs), and slaughtered more than
1.2 million chickens around the end of 1997 [3], thus suc-
cessfully controlling the outbreak [4]. However, HPAI
H5N1 viruses reappeared in 2003, spread across continents,
and sickened 826 patients from 2003 to March 31, 2015
[5]. The overall case fatality rate was 53.3 % (404/826).
Close contact with poultry is an important risk factor in
H5N1 infection [6, 7].
In Southeast Asia, infections have mostly occurred in
LPMs, where activities such as slaughtering, removal of
feathers, customers touching chickens, transportation, and
cleaning poultry waste occur very frequently [8, 9]. Import-
antly, most of the low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI)
H7N9 viruses, which caused human infections in different
parts of China since February of 2013 [10], had high viral
sequence identities to the H7N9 viruses isolated from wet
poultry markets [11]. This was quite different from the
avian influenza (AI) outbreaks in Europe and Africa, which
occurred mostly in poultry farms where migratory birds
played an important role [9]. Therefore, exposure to AI vi-
ruses (AIVs) in LPMs in Asia has been highly risky [12].
The increasing number of fatal cases due to H5N1 infec-
tions prompted the government of Hong Kong to initiate
policies forbidding the slaughtering of live chickens or other
poultry in wet markets [13].
The awareness of AI has been documented to affect a
persons’ self-protection behaviors [14] and live poultry pur-
chases [15]. It is important for mass media (such as televi-
sion channels) to provide correct information to enhance
the receivers’ knowledge and risk awareness [16]. An indi-
vidual’s level of education [17], occupation (such as being
poultry workers) [18, 19], and the residential area’s experi-
ences with AI outbreaks [16, 20] may all affect a person’s
perception of the risk of AI and their subsequent use of ad-
equate personal protective equipment [21]. Thus, under-
standing all possible factors associated with risk awareness,
attitudes, and practice of prevention measures (RAP), as
well as differences in risk perception of outbreaks due to
LPAI versus HPAI viruses between the live-poultry market
workers (LPMWs) and community residents (CRs) are all
important for providing further education and implement-
ing public health policies on preventing AI infection.
Taiwan, with close proximity to these Asian AI epi-
demic and endemic centers, has many LPMs which
could be potential sources of AI virus maintenance for
emerging novel influenza reassortant viruses. The first
AI outbreak of H5N2 in Taiwan started in December
2003, and subsequently these LPAI H5N2 viruses spread
island-wide [22]. Although a policy to stamp them out
was implemented from 2003 through 2004, this virus
subtype remained in circulation for many years. In October
2008, another outbreak of H5N2 occurred in Kaohsiung
(located in southern Taiwan), and a molecular analysis of
the cleavage site of HA of the isolated virus indicated that it
was high pathogenic. As the chicken pathogenicity index
(intravenous pathogenicity index, IVPI) of the specimens
collected for the second time was below 1.2 (IVPI = 0.89),
the government officials announced and reported it as an
outbreak of LPAI to the World Organization for Animal
Health (OIE) (http://www.oie.int/) [23, 24]. In fact, both of
these LPAI and HPAI H5N2 viruses are particularly unique,
as they consist of reassortants of six internal segments de-
rived from local Taiwan LPAI H6N1 viruses, but the HA
and NA segments had the highest viral sequence identities
with the 1994 Mexican-like H5N2 viruses [25, 26]. After
the first HPAI H5N2 outbreak was officially announced on
March 5, 2012, about 53,000 and 4,500 chickens were
culled in Changhua and Tainan Counties in central Taiwan,
respectively during February-March 2012 [27].
The elevation from LPAI H5N2 to HPAI H5N2 viruses
in recent years in Taiwan provides a great opportunity to
investigate whether the RAP of high-risk populations of
those working in LPMs versus local CRs were different
when facing the greater challenges of HPAI H5N2 vi-
ruses compared to the past LPAI H5N2 ones. Therefore,
the specific aims of this study were: (1) to investigate the
factors associated with high and low levels of RAP
among LPMWs and CRs in outbreak areas throughout
Taiwan immediately following the announcement by the
government on outbreaks of LPAI H5N2; (2) to compare
the differences in the factors associated with RAP after
the outbreaks of these AI viruses with low versus high
pathogenicity; and (3) to identify the different sources of
information regarding the 2012 outbreaks of HPAI-
H5N2 in chickens in central Taiwan among LPMWs and
CRs as well as to compare their willingness to take pre-
ventive measures against LPAI-H5N2 and the other im-
portant emerging infectious diseases.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to
investigate public health awareness of both LPAI and
HPAI of the same subtype viruses. Moreover, our find-
ings could help public health administrators in areas or
countries with LPAI to better prepare for possible subse-
quent HPAI outbreaks or minimize the numbers of hu-
man infections with either LPAI or HPAI viruses.
Methods
Study design, sampling strategy and study population
To fully understand the differences in local responses
after the outbreaks of LPAI and HPAI of H5N2 viruses
in Taiwan, we conducted two-stage surveys including:
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(1) stage I: after the outbreaks caused by LAPI H5N2 vi-
ruses from January 2007 to January 2009, and (2) stage
II: after the outbreaks caused by HPAI H5N2 viruses
from February to March 2012. In the first-stage survey
(before HPAI H5N2 outbreaks), 11 representative LPMs
were selected across Taiwan, including two markets each
in northern, central, and southern Taiwan, and five mar-
kets in eastern Taiwan as illustrated in Fig. 1. To in-
crease the sample size for the areas with LPAI H5N2
outbreaks, which is the most neglected and important
issue to be addressed, we covered all the major LPMs in
the outbreak areas and asked as many people as possible
to answer the questions at each study site. Since the out-
breaks of LAPI H5N2 occurred in different years in vari-
ous geographical areas, surveys were initiated in the wet
markets in different time periods, right after the occur-
rence of outbreaks, including northern Taiwan (January
to June 2007), central Taiwan (April to August 2008),
eastern Taiwan (February to May 2008), and southern
Taiwan (January 2009). After the outbreaks of HPAI
Fig. 1 Geographical distributions of study sites (live-bird markets) in different parts of Taiwan. Location of markets selected for study during 1st
survey in Taiwan from January 2007 to January 2009 (marked as circle in green), and markets during 2nd survey in Taiwan between February and
March 2012 (marked as star in red)
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H5N2, which were restricted to Changhwa County in
central Taiwan between February and March 2012, the
second-stage survey was conducted in the two LPMs situ-
ated in the outbreak county (shown in Fig. 1) with a smaller
sample size from late June to early July 2012. For better
comparison of the outcome measures between the two
studied populations — (1) live-poultry market workers
(LPMWs) as a “high-risk group” and (2) community resi-
dents (CRs) as a “low-risk group”, we used convenience
sampling among these two groups for each of the study
areas. The CRs, who were buyers but did not sell or touch
any live poultry, were sampled from visitors who shopped
at the same LPMs or visited the closest convenience stores
(such as 7–11 stores) at the same time as we asked
LPMWs.
Questionnaire and data collection
A structural questionnaire was designed to investigate:
(1) AI awareness, (2) knowledge of government policies,
and (3) protection measures used. To achieve the study
objective, the team members who designed and reviewed
the questionnaire included infectious disease physicians,
infectious disease epidemiologists, scholars experienced
in knowledge, attitude and practice (KAP) of diseases,
field workers who frequently went to LPM to take
poultry specimens, and administrators in LPMs. The
questionnaire included items such as demographic infor-
mation, job duties, prevention measures, personal per-
ceptions, the impact of China’s AI outbreaks on Taiwan,
attitudes toward different policies such as killing poultry
at LPMs, and potential confounding variables (age, gen-
der, educational level, and living area) [Additional file 1:
Appendix 1, Additional file 3: Appendix 3]. We did a
pilot test on both study groups in different geographical
areas to assure full understanding and reliability. After a
comprehensive review by questionnaire design team
members, the wording of the questionnaire was revised
and simplified to maximize the response rates. There
were five main questions measuring risk awareness, atti-
tudes and personal protection measures (RAP) [Additional
file 3: Appendix 3]. In addition to these five main questions,
questions on the awareness of HPAI H5N2 outbreaks in
2012 and risk perception in LPAI-H5N2, HPAI-H5N2 and
other important infectious diseases in Taiwan [such as se-
vere acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)] were also in-
cluded in the questionnaire of the second surveys for better
comparison. Most questions were multiple choice, with a
comprehensive range of choices or differential scales or
rankings [Additional file 4: Appendix 4]. However, the sec-
ond main question on possible future outbreaks of human
cases of infection with AIVs in Taiwan was measured by
the Likert scale. The questionnaire was administered by
well-trained interviewers.
Data analysis and statistical tests
For better assessment of the exposure levels, the LPM
workers were further classified into three risk groups,
based on their occupational exposures. The “high-risk
group” included butchers and sellers of raw chicken or
duck meat. The “moderate-risk group” covered sellers of
cooked chicken or duck meet, beef, mutton, pork, and
other raw meat sellers. The “low-risk group” included
other workers. Regarding the risk levels among the mar-
ket workers, the results showed that workers in all these
three risk groups were located significantly more in
northern Taiwan than in the rest of Taiwan (p = 0.01,
Table 2). We then focused on the comparisons of all
possible factors that may be associated with RAP; in par-
ticular, the differences on each question between
LPMWs and CRs based on their occupation were ana-
lyzed. Only statistically significant differences between
these two study groups are presented in Tables 3 and 5,
with the covariate of “occupation” adjusted in multivari-
ate analyses.
Demographic characteristics (including age, gender,
living area and education level) were summarized as fre-
quencies and percentages. In order to analyze the re-
spondents’ answers, we classified their responses on
RAP measures into a binary scale (positive and negative
perception of the questions) and used a chi-square test
and logistic regression for univariate and multivariate
analyses, respectively. Additional file 4: Appendix 4 is
the summary for all the assigned “positives” as “1 s” and
“negatives” as “0 s” as a binary scale. For univariate ana-
lysis, a chi-squared test was used to compare differences
in categorical variables [such as age: 17–40, 41–64
and≧65 (elderly)] and outcome of KAP measures between
LPMWs and CRs. The outcome variables, explanatory vari-
ables, as well as the model performance for data analyses in
this study are all summarized in Additional file 3: Appendix
3. The comparison of perception changes before and after
chicken H5N2 outbreaks in central Taiwan was analyzed by
two-proportion Z-test (Table 7).
For multivariate analysis, we pooled LPMWs and CRs
together and then analyzed the outcome measures for
each question. Then, logistic regression with stepwise se-
lection of variables was used for estimating the adjusted
odds ratios (OR) of explanatory factors and their 95 %
confidence intervals (95 % CI) after adjusting for import-
ant confounding variables such as age [28], gender, resi-
dential area (northern, southern, central and eastern
Taiwan), education level, and occupation (i.e., LPM-
workers and community residents), plus the other out-
come variables in addition to the asked RAP questions
for both LPAI and HPAI surveys in Tables 3 and 5, re-
spectively. For example, the last question, on effective-
ness of vaccines, and the variables from all other
questions in the same RAP Table such as impact of
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China on Taiwan were entered for better assessment.
For the best statistical performance, both age and educa-
tion were entered as continuous variables. Only signifi-
cant variables (p < 0.05) were included in our final
model. Therefore, we controlled for the regional differ-
ences in each analyses of both the 1st- and 2nd-stage
surveys.
To ensure the validity of our results, basic model-fitting
techniques for (1) variable selection, (2) goodness-of-fit
(GOF) assessment, and (3) regression diagnostics were all
used in our regression analyses. The statistical analysis was
performed using SAS 9.1.3 (SAS Institute, Cary, NC,
U.S.A.). Variables with p-value less than 0.05 were consid-
ered statistically significant. Cox & Snell R-square and
Nagelkerke R-square were applied and the results listed in
Additional file 3: Appendix 3.
Ethics
The study and its consent procedures were approved by
the Ethical Committee of National Taiwan University
Hospital (Approval Number: 201101069RC). Respon-
dents were informed of the purpose of the study, while
oral consent was obtained before anonymous question-
naires were administered. Due to concern for privacy of
the Chinese signatures of names, written informed con-
sent was not collected. Whenever the respondents did
not agree to join the study, the interviewers respected
their opinions and did not continue for those cases. For
the respondents aged less than 18 years, the interviewers
first got the agreement of their parents or guardians.
Otherwise, the interviewers dropped these cases. In
other words, all the successfully collected questionnaires
were agreed to verbally by the adult respondents them-
selves or children’s parents or guardians. In addition, our
data were fully de-identified to protect the respondents’
privacy, and only group data were used for further ana-
lyses and statistical tests.
Results
Demographic analyses and response rates of the study
populations
Both surveys recruited LPMWs and CRs. The response
rates for high-, moderate-, and low-risk groups of
LPMWs and CRs in the stage I survey were 98 %, 95 %,
93 %, and 90 %, respectively. Such rates for LPMWs and
CRs in the stage II survey were 80 % and 90 %, respect-
ively. The response rates for LPM workers after the
HPAI H5N2 outbreaks were lower than those after the
LPAI H5N2 outbreaks.
In the first-stage survey after the LPAI H5N2 out-
breaks but before the HPAI H5N2 outbreaks, a total of
848 questionnaires were administered, including 430 to
LPMWs and 418 to CRs (Table 1). In stage I, there were
significant differences in gender and education, but the
results were comparable across age and geographical
distributions, without statistical differences between
these two groups [Tables 1 and 2]. However, workers in
the wet markets had a significantly higher proportion of
males [52.6 % (226/430)] as compared to the CRs
[29.9 % (125/418)] (p < 0.001). Overall, the CRs had
higher levels of education than the LPMWs (p < 0.001).
In the second stage survey (after the outbreaks of HPAI
H5N2 in central Taiwan), 225 respondents (73 LPMWs
and 152 CRs) completed the questionnaires. In this
subgroup (Table 4), the LPMWs were significantly less
educated (p < 0.001) and older [mean ± standard devi-
ation (S.D.) of age (by years): 49.1 ± 14.6 vs. 32.2 ±
13.5, p < 0.001)] than those CRs of the same local areas
with HPAI outbreaks.
Factors associated with risk awareness, attitude and
preventive measures of AI before the outbreaks of HPAI
H5N2
Firstly, we analyzed possible factors influencing the
awareness of AI in stage I before the outbreaks of HPAI
H5N2 in Taiwan (Table 3). As to the impact of China on
Taiwan (Question 1 of Table 3), the respondents with
higher levels of education thought that the external out-
breaks of AI in poultry or in human cases in China
would affect Taiwan (OR: 2.09, 95 % CI: 1.48–2.95),
whereas those who opposed the ban on live poultry
slaughter in Taiwan’s traditional markets did not believe
in such an influence (OR: 0.34, 95 % CI: 0.18–0.64).
Next, the risk awareness regarding the impact of domes-
tic AI outbreaks was assessed (Question 2 of Table 3). Be-
sides level of education, respondents’ age and residential
area also influenced their risk awareness of human infection
of AI in Taiwan after the local LPAI outbreaks. The older
participants (OR, 0.98; 95 % CI, 0.97–1.00) and those living
in central Taiwan (OR, 0.59; 95 % CI, 0.41–0.84), where the
population density of chickens is the highest and outbreaks
of LPAI-H5N2 frequently occurred, were less likely to think
that Taiwan residents would get infection with AIVs. How-
ever, the respondents living in the H5N2 epidemic site of
Kaohsiung County in southern Taiwan in January 2009
with different awareness of AI (after the controversial judg-
ment on the causing agents as LPAI or HPAI viruses in the
2008 outbreak) compared with those in other areas, per-
ceived that people in Taiwan would become more likely to
be infected with AIVs (OR: 3.27, 95 % CI: 2.01–5.31).
Since the government announced the new policy of
“Ten No’s, Five Needs” in 2005 (Additional file 2: Ap-
pendix 2) after many outbreaks of LPAI H5N2, we then
investigated the factors associated with knowing this
policy and a possible future ban on slaughtering live
poultry in traditional markets (Question 3 of Table 3).
The results showed that greater percentages of respon-
dents with higher levels of education or living in central
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or eastern Taiwan knew the contents of the new govern-
ment policy on AI than those in other areas (central
Taiwan OR, 3.37; 95 % CI, 2.42–4.70 and eastern Taiwan
OR, 3.87; 95 % CI, 2.63–5.71). On the other hand, those
who had less belief that human cases of AI would not
happen in Taiwan (OR: 0.58, 95 % CI: 0.36–0.91) and
those who were less opposed to banning live poultry
slaughtering in LPMs (OR: 0.76, 95 % CI: 0.56–1.01) had
knowledge of this new policy.
Most importantly, we evaluated self-protection measures
that are very crucially important to preventing AI infection
(Question 4 of Table 3). LPMWs (compared to CRs: OR,
Table 1 Distribution of variables among two study populations during the study period after LPAI H5N2 outbreaks (Stage I) in
Taiwan, 2007–2009
Characteristics Two study populations p-value
Live-poultry market workers Community residents
N = 430 % N = 418 %
Age (Years) 17-40 141 32.8 165 39.5 0.06
41-64 268 62.3 241 57.7
≥65 21 4.9 12 2.9
Gender Male 226 52.6 125 29.9 <0.001*
Female 204 47.4 293 70.1
Geographical Areas North 195 45.3 193 46.2 0.97
Central 104 24.2 100 23.9
South 61 14.2 55 13.2
East 70 16.3 70 16.7
Education ≦Elementary 89 20.7 50 12.0 <0.001*
Junior high 133 30.9 95 22.8
Senior high 169 39.3 157 37.6
≧College 39 9.1 115 27.6
Table 2 Distribution of demographic variables among live-poultry market workers by levels of risk in the study period after LPAI
H5N2 outbreaks (Stage I) in Taiwan, 2007–2009
High risk§ Moderate risk§ Low risk§
Variables N = 73 % N = 113 % N = 244 % p-value
Age (Years) 17–40 24 32.9 34 30.1 83 32.8 0.95
41–64 45 61.6 74 65.5 149 62.3
≧65 4 5.5 5 4.4 12 4.9
Gender Male 44 60.3 65 57.5 117 48.0 0.09
Female 29 39.7 48 42.5 127 52.0
Geographical Areas North 33 45.2 40 35.4 122 50.0 0.01*
Central 16 21.9 38 33.6 50 20.5
South 8 11.0 11 9.7 42 17.2
East 16 21.9 24 21.2 30 12.3
Education ≦Elementary 22 30.1 20 17.7 47 19.3 0.27
Junior high 16 21.9 40 35.4 77 31.6
Senior high 30 41.1 44 38.9 95 38.9
≧College 5 6.8 9 8.0 25 10.2
In Stage I, the mean, median, and range of age for CRs were 43.6 ± 11.4, 44.0, and 18–84, respectively whereas those for live poultry market workers (LPMWs)
were 45.8 ± 11.3, 47.0, and 17–87, respectively. We used a chi-square test for the statistical analyses in Table 1. There was no significant difference between these
two groups [Table 1]
The data within the percentages of community residents related to the different demographical variables in the Stage I survey served as the reference group in
this Tables 1 and 2
§High Risk: butcher, raw chicken/duck sellers. Moderate Risk: Sellers of cooked chicken/duck, beef, pork, mutton, and/or other raw meat. Low Risk: Market
cleaners, administrative officers, and those selling flowers, dry goods, vegetables and fruits. *p-value < 0.05
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0.47; 95 % CI, 0.28–0.80), the respondents from eastern
Taiwan, where fewer outbreaks were reported (OR, 0.53;
95 % CI, 0.28–1.00), and those without opinions on the
banning of poultry slaughtering (OR, 0.42; 95 % CI,
0.25–0.70), were all less motivated than those in the
comparison groups to implement self-protection mea-
sures against AIVs. By contrast, both respondents who
believed human cases of AI would appear in Taiwan
(OR: 2.28, 95 % CI: 1.13–4.60) and those who were also
more aware about the new policy“Ten No’s, Five
Needs” (OR: 2.41, 95 % CI: 1.46–3.97) had more will-
ingness to engage in self-protection against AIVs. In
other words, the study subjects’ awareness of risk on AI
in Taiwan and attitude in supporting or opposing gov-
ernment policies were associated with their taking sub-
sequent personal prevention and control measures. On
Table 3 Risk awareness, attitudes, and protection behaviors against avian influenza in period after LPAI H5N2 outbreaks (Stage I) in
Taiwan, 2007–2009
5 Surveyed questions Variables ORs 95 % CI
1. Taiwan will be affected by the outbreaks of influenza
in China
Educational Status 2.09 1.48–2.95
Oppose ban on live poultry slaughtering in traditional
markets
0.34 0.18–0.64
2. Taiwan residents will become infected with avian
influenza (AI)
Educational Status 1.42 1.19–1.69
Believe outbreak of AI in China will affect Taiwan 2.22 1.55–3.18
Support ban on live poultry markets 1.51 1.10–2.06
Southern Taiwana 3.27 2.01–5.31
Central Taiwana 0.59 0.41–0.84
Ageb 0.98 0.97–1.00
3. Knowing new “Ten No’s, Five Needs” policy Educational Status 1.26 1.08–1.46
Central Taiwana 3.37 2.42–4.70
Eastern Taiwana 3.87 2.63–5.71
Believe Taiwan residents will not be infected with avian
influenza
0.58 0.36–0.91
Oppose ban on live poultry slaughter in traditional
markets
0.76 0.56–1.01
4. Willing to take self-protection measures against avian
influenza viral infection
Live-poultry market workersc 0.47 0.28–0.80
Believe AI cases will appear in Taiwan 2.28 1.13–4.60
Aware of new “10 No’s, 5 Needs” policy 2.41 1.46–3.97
Eastern Taiwana 0.53 0.28–1.00
Believe outbreaks of AI from Mainland China will not
affect Taiwan
0.14 0.07–0.28
Have no opinions on banning birds from being slaughtered
in traditional markets
0.42 0.25–0.70
5. The vaccine will provide effective protection against
avian influenza viral infection
Live-poultry market workersc 0.30 0.17–0.50
Believe AI from Mainland China will not affect Taiwan 0.21 0.09–0.46
Aware of “Ten No’s, Five Needs” policy 0.52 0.31–0.88
Believe it is unnecessary to protect oneself against AI viral
infection
0.19 0.10–0.35
Central Taiwana 0.10 0.01–0.83
Eastern Taiwana 0.05 0.01–0.39
Northern Taiwana 0.03 0.00–0.24
We used logistic regression for the statistical analyses in Table 3. For better statistical performance, education status was only significant as a “continuous variable”
in Question #1 to #3 but not as a “dummy categorical variable”
CI Confidence Interval
aOther areas as a reference
bAge: A continuous variable
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the contrary, those who believed that AI outbreaks
from mainland China would not have an impact on
Taiwan did not implement self-protection measures
against AIVs (OR, 0.14; 95 % CI, 0.07–0.28).
Regarding the perceptions on effectiveness of influenza
vaccines (Question 5 of Table 3), market workers were
more likely to have a negative perception about the effect-
iveness of avian or human influenza vaccines to protect
against human infection with AIVs (OR: 0.30, 95 % CI:
0.17–0.50). Similarly, the respondents living in northern
Taiwan (OR: 0.03, 95 % CI: 0.00–0.24), central Taiwan
(OR: 0.10, 95 % CI: 0.01–0.83) and eastern Taiwan (OR:
0.05, 95 % CI: 0.01–0.39), compared to those from other
areas also had lower perceptions of the effectiveness of any
influenza vaccine. All the odds ratios for flu vaccines were
less than one during the period before official announce-
ment of the HPAI H5N2 outbreaks.
Factors associated with risk awareness, attitude and
preventive measures after the outbreaks of HPAI H5N2
The results of the risk awareness, attitudes about, and
protective behaviors against AI after the outbreak of
HPAI H5N2 in Taiwan are summarized in Table 5. The
older respondents were less likely to believe that Taiwan
would be affected by the influenza outbreaks in main-
land China (OR: 0.85, 95 % CI: 0.78–0.93, Question 1).
Again, the impact of outbreaks of AI abroad as well as
in Taiwan was further explored (Questions 1 and 2).
Interestingly, there was a strong association between the
respondents’ beliefs about Taiwan’s human outbreaks of
AIV cases and influenza outbreaks in China (OR: 25.51,
95 % CI: 4.24–153.66). Moreover, the respondents who
perceived that the outbreaks in China would lead to hu-
man infection of AIV in Taiwan and those who believed
that Taiwan would face an AI threat reported that they
had more willingness to take preventive measures
against AIVs (OR, 6.83; 95 % CI, 2.10–22.26; OR, 3.88;
95 % CI, 1.16–12.98, respectively). Besides the impact of
mainland China, the participants who were aware of the
critical condition of the one H5N1 pediatric case in
Hong Kong in June 2012 were more likely to have good
knowledge of the new “Ten No’s, Five Needs” policy
(Question 3, OR, 4.24; 95 % CI, 2.09–8.59).
For public health prevention, both personal protection
and vaccination (Questions 4 and 5 of Table 5) were ex-
amined. The Taiwanese respondents knowing of the crit-
ical condition of the 2012 Hong Kong H5N1 pediatric
case (OR: 5.85, 95 % CI: 1.45–23.56), or believing in the
possibility of Taiwan’s domestic risk of future human in-
fection of AIVs (OR: 4.09, 95 % CI: 1.15–14.62), or hav-
ing knowledge of the severity of the threat posed by the
AI viruses (OR: 6.62, 95 % CI: 1.54–28.55) all reported
the habit of carrying out self-protection measures for
preventing AI viral infection. For other preventive
measures, only participants who believed in the effect-
iveness of seasonal influenza vaccines in protecting
against either human or avian flu (OR: 5.51, 95 % CI:
1.97–15.42) or both types of flu (OR: 7.65, 95 % CI:
2.61–22.43) would consider receiving AI vaccination.
Noteworthily, LPMWs were less likely to accept AI vac-
cine than those CRs in central Taiwan with HPAI out-
breaks [61.6 % (45/73) vs. 75.0 % (114/152), p = 0.04]
(Table 4).
The risk awareness of AI causing serious disease and
even death was evaluated (Question 6 of Table 5). CRs of
areas with documented chicken HPAI H5N2 outbreaks had
higher awareness of AI leading to severe human clinical
cases or fatalities (OR: 3.64, 95 % CI: 1.03–12.86) than CRs
of other areas. These respondents with greater alertness of
the AI severity not only had better knowledge of the new
“Ten No’s, Five Needs” policy (OR, 4.10; 95 % CI, 1.19–
14.12) but also were more likely to take preventive mea-
sures against AIVs (OR, 4.38; 95 % CI, 1.08–17.76).
After the government declared the outbreaks of HPAI
H5N2 in Taiwan in 2012, we found protective behaviors
and shopping habits were different between LPMWs and
CRs. Among the 221 respondents, 81 % of them washed
their hands frequently (179/221) and 75.1 % of them
(166/221, with 4 missing values) reported the intention
to wear facemasks to protect themselves once AI outbreaks
occur (Table 6). In this study, we did not differentiate
surgical masks from cloth masks in our questionnaire
on “facemasks”. However, most of the public can easily
buy surgical masks in convenience stores or drug
stores. Even among the CRs, high percentages of them
intended to change their shopping behaviors such as
avoiding both live-poultry markets (74/152, 48.7 %) and
poultry purchases (56/152, 36.8 %).
Differences in the factors associated with RAP after the
outbreaks of these AI viruses with regards to low versus
high pathogenicity
Comparing the perception differences before and after
the outbreaks of chicken HPAI H5N2 among the study
participants only in central Taiwan, our results revealed
significant increases in the proportion of both LPMWs
and CRs who perceived Taiwanese will be infected by
AIVs (Table 7). After the occurrence of domestic HPAI
H5N2 outbreaks, the LPMWs’ risk perception on the
possibility of AI epidemics in mainland China affecting
Taiwan significantly decreased (94.2 to 69.9 %, p < 0.05),
but their risk awareness on the likelihood of people in
central Taiwan being infected with AIVs strikingly in-
creased (from 34.6 to 65.6 %, p < 0.05). However, the
LPMWs’ belief that vaccines are capable of preventing
human or avian influenza virus infection strikingly de-
creased (92.3 to 68.5 %, p < 0.05).
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Sources of information regarding the 2012 outbreaks of
HPAI in chickens in central Taiwan among live poultry
market workers versus community residents
After the incident of HPAI-H5N2 outbreaks in central
Taiwan, we asked participants whether they knew that
HPAI outbreaks had occurred there. Among those who
knew about the HPAI H5N2 outbreaks, LPMWs had sig-
nificantly paid more attention to the 2012 AI outbreaks
than CRs [87.7 % (64/73) vs. 78.3 % (119/152), p = 0.03]
(Table 8). Detailed analysis of the sources of information on
these HPAI outbreaks (Table 5) showed that the major
channel for receiving information on the outbreaks for both
groups was television broadcasts (LPMWs vs CR: 90.6 % vs
84.9 %, p = 0.27), followed by the internet and relatives or
friends for CRs (37 %) and newspapers for LPMWs
(15.6 %). However, seeking information through newspa-
pers, internet and radio broadcasts was statistically more
common among the CRs than the LPMWs (newspapers:
34.5 % vs. 15.6 %, p < 0.01; internet: 37.0 % vs. 10.9 %,
p < 0.001; radio: 12.6 % vs. 1.6 %, p < 0.05).
Risk perceptions of LPAI H5N2, HPAI H5N2 and other
important emerging infectious diseases
Comparing the respondents’ risk perception of LPAI
H5N2, HPAI H5N2 and other important emerging in-
fectious diseases (EIDs) versus the old disease of
tuberculosis (Table 9), severe acute respiratory syn-
drome (SARS) was perceived as the most risky infec-
tious disease by the respondents, while HPAI H5N2
was thought much more important than LPAI H5N2,
particularly among market workers (HPAI vs LPAI for
LPMWs: 64.4 % vs 31.5 %, p <0.05; for CRs: 54.6 % vs
33.6 %, p <0.05).
Discussion
Global epidemiology of AI has focused mostly on human
cases after the outbreaks of HPAI [29, 30], with little at-
tention to LPAI. To our knowledge, this is the first study
to compare the differences in risk awareness, attitude
and personal protection practice (RAP) right after the
outbreaks of both LPAI and HPAI of the same virus sub-
type. We have the following five major findings that may
help future global efforts to prevent novel AI viruses
(AIVs) with pandemic threat to human populations.
First, risk awareness, positive attitudes and taking pre-
ventive measures depend on several factors, including
high or low pathogenicity of AIVs (HPAIVs or LPAIVs),
working in LPMs, level of education, age, proximity to
the sites of severe AI outbreaks, knowledge of AI out-
breaks in neighboring countries or areas (e.g., mainland
China or Hong Kong), the level of understanding of im-
portant knowledge on AIVs, and learning preventive
measures through various channels of mass media. Second,
Table 4 Distributions of demographical variables and avian influenza vaccine acceptability among respondents (interviewed in poultry
markets or community residents) from Changhwa County in Central Taiwan after Chicken HPAI H5N2 outbreaks (Stage II Survey)
Variables Two study populations p-value
Live-poultry market workers Community residents
N = 73 % N = 152 %
Age (Years) 11–40 18 24.7 106 69.7 <0.001*
41–64 46 63.0 41 27.0
≧65 9 12.3 1 3.3
Missing 0 4
Gender Male 28 38.4 48 36.4 0.78
Female 45 61.6 84 63.6
Missing 0 20
Education ≦Elementary 21 28.8 2 1.4 <0.001*
Junior high 16 21.9 11 7.7
Senior high 22 30.1 44 31.0
≧College 14 19.2 85 59.9
Missing 0 10
Acceptance of avian influenza vaccinea Yes 45 61.6 114 75.0 0.04*
In Stage II, the mean, median, and range of age for CRs were 32.2 ± 13.5, 30.0, and 13–73, respectively whereas those for LPMWs were 49.1 ± 14.6, 50.0, and 11–87,
respectively. We used a chi-square test for the statistical analyses in Table 4. LPMWs were significantly older than CRs (p < 0.001)
*p-value < 0.05. The data within the percentages of community residents related to the different demographical variables in the Stage II survey served as the
reference group in this Table 4
aOur government officials initiated the pilot study of phase 1 H5N1 avian influenza vaccine trial for animal-related workers in 2009. At that time, the acceptance
rate was quite low. Therefore, the data of the reported “acceptance of avian influenza vaccine between live-poultry market workers and community residents”
were thus compared only after the 2nd survey in Table 4
Liu et al. BMC Infectious Diseases  (2015) 15:241 Page 9 of 15
respondents with higher risk perception (concerning hu-
man AI infections in Taiwan) before HPAI outbreaks had
not only more awareness about the AI outbreaks in main-
land China affecting Taiwan, but also better attitudes to-
ward meeting domestic needs (endorsing the government’s
new policy on AI, and supporting a ban on slaughtering live
poultry in markets). Third, participants’ better attitudes to-
wards AI prevention and control were associated with
higher motivation to practice self-protection measures,
even in preventing LPAIVs. Fourth, individuals with lower
educational levels, the LPM workers with high exposure to
AIVs, and the respondents living in areas with low fre-
quency of AI outbreaks had a lower risk awareness of AIVs,
particularly LPAIVs that might be transmitted to humans.
Fifth, the respondents’ risk awareness and protective behav-
iors during the periods of LPAI H5N2 outbreaks strikingly
rose after experiencing the outbreaks of HPAI H5N2. All
these together suggest that neglecting health education and
precautions in LPMs might facilitate adaptation of the virus
in human populations, particularly the silent spreading of
LPAIVs.
High-risk populations in live-poultry markets
Among all the factors associated with RAP related to
human infection of AIVs, the pathogenicity of AI virus is
crucially important, particularly in those areas or coun-
tries with no prior experience of HPAI outbreaks.
However, most past studies have targeted poultry
workers as the high risk population due to exposure to
possible HPAIVs of H5 and H7 in sick or dead poultry
[31], neglecting the dynamic changes of AIVs from
LPAIVs to HPAIVs. Our study showed that risk percep-
tions changed significantly for both market workers and
the general population after HPAI outbreaks in Taiwan.
The increased pathogenicity of H5N2 AIVs may have
caused the study subjects to feel nervous, as they faced
the outbreaks of SARS in 2003 and the novel H1N1 in-
fluenza pandemic in 2009, thus raising risk perceptions.
Lower risk perception in these high-risk populations is a
general problem in different parts of the world, includ-
ing Taiwan [19], Italy, Thailand and China [18]. This
shows that high-exposure workers need more appropri-
ate information on AIVs to complement the information
through mass media, which is usually obtained after ra-
ther than before outbreaks. Generally, LPMWs before
the outbreaks of HPAI in this study also had a lower
perception of Taiwanese AI risk than local residents
(Question 2 in Table 7), so they did not adopt any pre-
ventive measures to avoid AIV infection, and did not be-
lieve the seasonal influenza vaccination was effective for
preventing human or avian influenza.
Live-poultry markets, the major interface areas be-
tween poultry and humans offering conditions for sus-
tainability, amplification, reassortment and cross-species
Table 5 Risk awareness, attitude and protection behaviors against avian influenza after chicken HPAI H5N2 outbreaks (Stage II
survey) in Taiwan
Questions ORs 95 % CI
Variables
1. Taiwan will be affected by the outbreaks of influenza
in China
Believe Taiwan residents will become infected with AIVs 25.51 4.24–153.66
Age 0.85 0.78–0.93
2. Taiwan residents will become infected with avian
influenza (AI)
Believe influenza outbreaks in China will affect Taiwan 6.83 2.10–22.26
Will take preventive measures against AI 3.88 1.16–12.98
3. Knowing new “Ten No’s, Five Needs” policya Aware of the critical condition of the child in Hong Kong
infected with H5N1
4.24 2.09–8.59
4. Willing to take self-protection measures against avian
influenza viral infection
Aware of critical condition of the child in Hong Kong
infected with H5N1
5.85 1.45–23.56
Believe people in Taiwan will be infected with AIVs 4.09 1.15–14.62
Know AI may cause serious diseases and death 6.62 1.54–28.55
5. Willing to receive avian influenza vaccination Believe seasonal flu vaccines can reduce chance of getting
human flu or AI
5.51 1.97–15.42
Believe seasonal flu vaccines can reduce chance of getting
human flu and AI
7.65 2.61–22.43
6. Know AI may cause serious illness and even death Know the “Ten No’s, Five Needs” policy 4.10 1.19–14.12
Community Residentsb 3.64 1.03–12.86
Will take preventive measures against AI 4.38 1.08–17.76
We used logistic regression for the statistical analyses in this Table 5
Age continuous variable, AIV Avian influenza viruses
CI Confidence Interva
aTen No’s, Five Needs policy in Appendix 2
bLive-poultry market workers as the control group
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transmission of AIVs, from H5N1 HPAIVs in 1997 [6] to
the most recent H7N9 LPAIVs in 2013–2015, have been
involved in many human-acquired AIV infections [32].
Most importantly, chickens sold in traditional LPMs can
transmit AIVs to humans through respiratory transmis-
sion [33]. Interestingly, the older participants, who had
more traditional thinking, and those living in central
Taiwan, where the density of layer-chickens ranks the
highest and outbreaks of LPAI-H5N2 occurred more fre-
quently than other areas, had lower risk awareness of
AIVs. By contrast, the respondents who lived in the epi-
demic site of Kaohsiung County in southern Taiwan,
where the cleavage site of hemagglutinin (HA) was iden-
tified as HPAIVs in 2008, had higher perceptions than
residents in other areas (OR: 3.27) that people in Taiwan
would become infected with AIVs.
After the outbreaks of chicken HPAI H5N2, the
LPMWs still had a lower belief in the effectiveness of
vaccination to prevent human or avian influenza virus
infection, regardless of their job duties. Furthermore,
compliance with and understanding of the government
policy raised the individual’s risk perception from
LPAIVs to HPAIVs, while other measures of risk aware-
ness had fewer differences among these two surveys, ex-
cept for the reduction in risk perception on possible AI
outbreaks in mainland China affecting Taiwan among
LPMWs in central Taiwan. Such a striking decrease can
be explained by the occurrence of the local HPAI out-
breaks instead of the imported infections. In other
words, attitudes became positive and preventive mea-
sures were reported to be taken when they faced the
threat of HPAIVs. This may have been influenced by
Table 6 Protection measures adopted by respondents in Central Taiwan after the HAPI H5N2 outbreak in 2012
Protection measuresa Two study populations p-value
Live-poultry market workers Community residents
(n = 69b) (n = 152)
Wash hands frequently 58(84.1 %) 121(79.6 %) 0.43
Wear facemasks 50(72.5 %) 116(76.3 %) 0.54
Comply with government’s policy 27(39.1 %) 89(58.6 %) <0.01**
Do Exercise 14(20.3 %) 66(43.4 %) <0.01**
Obtain more information 6(8.7 %) 61(40.1 %) <0.001***
Receive human flu vaccine 17(24.6 %) 49(32.2 %) 0.25
Receive AI H5N1 vaccine 8(11.6 %) 53(34.9 %) <0.01**
Take Tamiflu 3(4.3 %) 12(7.9 %) 0.33
Take Chinese herbs 6(8.7 %) 6(3.9 %) 0.15
Stop going to LPMsc - 74(48.7 %) -
Stop buying poultry in LPMsc - 56(36.8 %) -
We used chi-square test for the statistical analyses in Table 6
The data within the percentages of community residents related to the different preventive measures served as the reference group in this Table
LPMs Live-poultry markets
aThe answers are multiple choices
bTotal N = 73, with four missing values
cOnly asked for community residents in Central Taiwan
Table 7 Changes in perception among study participants before and after the 2012 chicken HPAI H5N2 outbreaks in Central Taiwan
Perception changes Live-poultry market workers Community residents
Before HPAI After HPAI p Before HPAI After HPAI p
N % N % N % N %
1. AI epidemics in China will affect Taiwan 104 94.20 % 73 69.9 % <0.001* 100 94.00 % 150 99.3 % 0.013*
2. People in Taiwan will be infected by AIVs 104 34.60 % 64 65.6 % <0.001* 100 44.00 % 149 76.5 % <0.001*
3. Respondents knew government (Ten No’s, Five Needs) policy 104 58.70 % 70 68.60 % 0.186 100 66.00 % 147 68.70 % 0.656
4. Respondents will take self-protection measures against AIVs 104 91.30 % 72 81.90 % 0.064 100 95.00 % 152 96.70 % 0.499
5. Vaccination can prevent human or avian influenza virus infection 104 92.30 % 73 68.5 % <0.001* 100 95.00 % 152 94.70 % 0.916
This survey was implemented during late June-July 2012, after the outbreak of HPAI H5N2
Data in the two columns of “Before HPAI for live-poultry market workers” (LPMWs) and “Before HPAI for community residents” (CRs) served as two reference
groups of LPMWs and CRs, respectively
N Number of participants who answered that specific question
*p-value < 0.05 *, using a two-proportion Z-test
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mass media or the experience of getting a voluntary
H5N1 AI vaccine. Therefore, our study demonstrated
that the perception of AI risk was elevated as the patho-
genicity of AIVs changed from low to high. These results
emphasize the public health significance of educating
high-risk populations, starting from LPAIVs with cap-
ability to donate viral gene segments for generating
novel reassortant viruses that may increase infectivity to
humans, like H7N9 and H10N8 in China [34, 35] and
H5N2 [25, 26] and H6N1 [36] in Taiwan.
Public health measures and policies
Three important policies for AI prevention and control
measures are closure of LPMs, practicing personal protect-
ive measures (PPM), and receiving influenza vaccines be-
fore flu seasons. In general, numerous LPMs are widely
distributed in urban areas that might facilitate avian-to-
human and subsequent human-to-human transmissions of
novel influenza viruses, unlike poultry farms, which are
more frequently located in rural areas. Such geographical
differences between the urban and rural areas affected the
awareness of AI in Turkey [37] and in China [38]. In the
past, closure of LPMs has been implemented after the con-
firmation of severe or fatal human cases of H5N1 and
H7N9 [39]. However, the virus may still reemerge after
temporary closure. Therefore, market shutdown is not the
most effective long-term measure, especially as the stake-
holders are not likely to support it. The most likely ap-
proaches are: (1) weekly and monthly off-market days (such
as Mondays and Chinese festivals in Taiwan) for cleaning
and interrupting viral transmission, (2) banning the slaugh-
ter of live poultry, (3) practicing PPM, and (4) receiving in-
fluenza vaccines. In fact, the LPMWs with lower education
in this study did adopt the latter three prevention measures
less frequently. On the other hand, more highly educated
participants believed that the outbreaks of AI in China
would affect Taiwanese, and thus supported the ban on
slaughtering live poultry in markets.
A ban on slaughtering live poultry in the market, first
proposed in Hong Kong [40], has been implemented by
the revised food commerce law [40]. In 2008, a woman
in Beijing without prior contact with live birds was
infected with AIVs after purchasing live poultry in a
traditional market [12], implying that LPMs are one of
the sources of AIV infection. Furthermore, most of the
severe human H7N9 cases in 2013–2014 also acquired
their infections through contact with poultry or visiting
wet markets [10]. Although the Taiwan government ini-
tiated the implementation of the policy to ban slaughter-
ing live poultry in LPMs on April 1st, 2008 (e.g., after
the H5N2 outbreak in Kaohsiung with controversial an-
swers on viral pathogenicity), this was postponed, then
reinstated on May 17, 2013 due to the occurrence of the
first imported H7N9 case in Taiwan. In this study, less-
educated, high-risk groups had lower RAP. Therefore,
enhancing surveillance of AIVs in avian hosts as well as
humans in LPMs [26], timely epidemiologic data ana-
lyses and prompt risk communication with evidence-
based data support, focusing on changing the minds of
lower-educated, high-risk groups, will be very helpful to
quickly control novel influenza viruses, thus minimizing
the occurrence of potential pandemics.
Table 8 Sources and channels of information about 2012
outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza in chickens in
Central Taiwan (Stage II Survey)
Aware of HPAI Two study populations p-value
Live-poultry market Community
Workers (n = 64) Residents
(n = 119)
0.03a,b
Sources n % n %
Television 58 90.6 101 84.9 0.28
Newspapers 10 15.6 41 34.5 <0.01
Internet 7 10.9 44 37.0 <0.001
Relatives or Friends 5 7.8 18 15.1 0.16
Radio 1 1.6 15 12.6 <0.05
Other Market Workers 4 6.3 3 2.5 0.21
Phone Calls/Messages 0 0.0 1 0.8 0.48
The data within the percentages of community residents related to the
sources or channels of information served as the reference group in
this Table 8
P-values: Chi-square test was used for the statistical analyses
aThere were 73 live-poultry market workers, 64 of whom (87.7 %) knew about
the HPAI outbreaks in central Taiwan
bThere were 152 live-poultry market workers, 119 of whom (78.3 %) knew
about the HPAI outbreaks in central Taiwan
Table 9 Willingness to take preventive measures for the
selected infectious diseases (Stage II Survey)
Infectious diseasesa Two study populations p-value
Live-poultry market
workers (N = 73)
Community




60 (82.2 %) 112 (73.7 %) 0.159
HPAI H5N2 47 (64.4 %) 83 (54.6 %) 0.164
2009 Pandemic H1N1 46 (63.0 %) 101 (66.4 %) 0.612
Enterovirus 24 (32.9 %) 86 (56.6 %) 0.001*
LPAI H5N2 23 (31.5 %) 51 (33.6 %) 0.760
Tuberculosis 21 (28.8 %) 76 (50 %) 0.003*
The data within the percentages of community residents related to the
willingness to take preventive measures for the selected infectious diseases
served as the reference group in this Table 9
HPAI Highly pathogenic avian influenza
LPAI Lowly pathogenic avian influenza
*p-value <0.05 by chi-square test
aNumbers in this table indicate how many respondents indicated they were
willing to take preventive measures against each disease listed. Respondents
were given a list and were free to select any or all of the infectious diseases
(that they would protect themselves from)
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PPMs are particularly useful for reducing the risk of
acquiring or transmitting emerging respiratory infections
before the availability of commercial vaccines [41]. Edu-
cation is the most cost-effective approach to deliver the
correct knowledge and ways to prevent AIV infections
and future epidemics. Highly educated persons who had
better access to the information on AI from television,
newspapers and the internet in this study had higher risk
perception of AI, similar to the findings in China [16]
and Afghanistan [42]. Most importantly, strict compli-
ance with personal protective equipment (PPE) require-
ments must be reinforced to manage the outbreaks of
AI, regardless of the pathogenicity of the virus [43, 44].
Incomplete use of PPE was also associated with conjunc-
tivitis and influenza-like illness after the 2006 outbreak
of LPAI H7N3 in Norfolk, England [21]. Generally, com-
pliance with most PPE requirements tends to be sub-
optimal for the highly exposed groups [45]. Similarly,
Taiwanese LPM-workers generally feel that wearing PPE
is uncomfortable, and they have not gotten used to it.
The low risk perception accompanying such poor PPE
usage needs to be guided with solid examples to finally
achieve behavioral change. Our study subjects who had
higher risk perception of AI and who were more aware
about the government’s new policy had more motivation
to use self-protection for preventing AIVs. Therefore, it
is necessary to improve public awareness about the gov-
ernment’s prevention policy and also educate different
target groups with various approaches, based on educa-
tional levels, job duties, and residential areas.
Identifying populations with low acceptance rates of
influenza vaccine is important before developing and imple-
menting vaccination programs, particularly as the accept-
ance of influenza vaccines has become quite low in recent
years in many parts of the world [46, 47]. We found that
market workers and the respondents living in Taiwan
(except the HPAI H5N2 outbreak sites in southern
Taiwan) did not believe that any influenza vaccine pro-
vided effective protection against AIVs. A significant
drop was observed in the perception of the vaccine ef-
fectiveness in preventing “avian influenza” after the im-
pact of HPAI compared to LPAI H5N2 outbreaks for
both LPMWs (6.9 % vs 20.2 %) and CRs (7.9 % vs
19 %). In addition, respondents who did not believe in
the external influence of outbreaks of AI in Mainland
China, as well as those who paid no attention to do-
mestic policy in Taiwan, and those who found no need
to protect themselves against AIV infection did not
trust the effectiveness of any influenza vaccine for
humans or poultry. To solve this problem, risk commu-
nication on sources of the risk as well as scientific data
supporting safety becomes very important. Addition-
ally, easy access of high-risk populations to AI vaccines
(similar to the established system for seasonal influenza
vaccination of schoolchildren and the elderly in Taiwan,
supported by a well-established public health infra-
structure), a feasible plan on resources allocation, and
the available AI vaccine inducing higher immunogen-
icity through better innate immunity [48, 49] all to-
gether, with systematic approaches, will reduce human
infections of AIVs.
There are three major limitations of this study. First,
there is a possibility of selection bias caused by the will-
ingness of respondents to reply to the questions in the
survey, even though we covered most of the live poultry
markets affected by the outbreaks, and the LPMWs’ re-
sponse rates were 93–98 % and 80 % after the outbreaks
of LPAI H5N2 and HPAI H5N2, respectively. In
addition, the 2nd-stage survey was conducted only in
central Taiwan, where the scale of layer chickens was the
largest. Second, our results may show reduced RAP be-
cause more study subjects of LPMs in the 1st-stage sur-
vey came from northern Taiwan, where large-scale
wholesale broiler chickens and ducks coming from dif-
ferent parts of Taiwan are sold with better management
and hygienic standards, whereas high densities of poultry
farms are located in central and southern Taiwan. Third,
the study subjects of the 1st and 2nd surveys were differ-
ent and not comparable, and those results indicate only
association rather than causation, because of the cross-
sectional study design. The outbreaks of LPAI H5N2
were larger in scale, and occurred much more frequently
and in more places than those of HPAI H5N2. To pro-
tect participants’ privacy, we did not collect personal
identification data, and therefore could not follow up on
the respondents in the initial survey. Future research
should focus on the most effective methods and con-
tents for risk communication in order to target different
risk groups. Risk perception problems on LPAIVs need
to be explored in relation to the scale, breeding style,
types, and sanitation of poultry farms and different kinds
of LPMs, particularly in areas with limited resources and
expertise. In addition, behavioral research is worth doing
to direct the best prevention and control policies, con-
sidering the acceptance of influenza vaccination and ac-
ceptable behavior change in high-risk groups versus the
general public.
Conclusions
Based on our findings, we sincerely recommend that
health agencies enhance additional routine two-way risk
communication with friendly interpersonal guidance for
live-poultry market workers, poultry butchers and
farmers, and related high-risk groups, particularly before
outbreaks of AI. In addition, to minimize political con-
cerns, fatal human cases after infection with AIV, includ-
ing LPAIVs of H7N9 and H10N8 [47] in other countries
can serve as solid examples for education, using easily
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understandable wordings and movies to demonstrate the
danger of aerosol transmission of AIVs. Above all, the
policy on banning the slaughter of live poultry at LPMs
supported by incentives of tax reduction or free health
care or certification to win customers’ trust, as well as
active virological and serological surveillance with ran-
dom sampling in poultry farms and markets, could be
the most efficient way to reduce cross-species transmis-
sion. In conclusion, person-to-person risk communica-
tion to high-risk groups using more acceptable and
attractive approaches and effective public policies on
“one health” [50], and post-policy evaluation with inter-
national comparison will be helpful to promote global
health.
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